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Leftover hashing from quantum error correction:
Unifying the two approaches to the security proof of quantum key distribution
Toyohiro Tsurumaru
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Information Technology R&D Center,
5-1-1 Ofuna, Kamakura-shi, Kanagawa, 247-8501, Japan.
We show that the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach and Renner’s approach to the security proof of
quantum key distribution (QKD) are essentially the same. We begin our analysis by considering a
special case of QKD called privacy amplification (PA). PA itself is an important building block of
cryptography, both classical and quantum. The standard theoretical tool used for its security proof
is called the leftover hashing lemma (LHL). We present a direct connection between the LHL and
the coding theorem of a certain quantum error correction code. Then we apply this result to prove
the equivalence between the two approaches to the security proof of QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technique for
distributing information-theoretically secure keys be-
tween two remote parties connected by a quantum chan-
nel [1, 2]. Today QKD is a real-world technology; tests
have carried out in various realistic situations, including
metropolitan fiber networks [3] and satellite communica-
tion [4]; there are also commercially available products
[5]. Behind such great news, there is always the secu-
rity proof. No QKD system cannot be secure unless a
rigorous security proof is given.
At the present, there are two major approaches for
obtaining security proofs:
• Phase error correction (PEC)-based approach:
This is usually called the Shor-Preskill approach,
or sometimes the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach
[6, 7]. One constructs a virtual QKD protocol
which has a quantum phase error correction (PEC)
algorithm embedded inside. The security analy-
sis is then reduced to upper bounding the failure
probability of the quantum PEC, e.g., by using a
coding theorem. This approach was initiated by
Mayers [6], and later simplified and improved by
many others including Shor and Preskill [7], Koashi
[8, 9], and Hayashi [10].
• Leftover hashing lemma (LHL)-based approach:
This is usually called Renner’s approach [11]. Once
a lower bound on the (smooth) minimum entropy
of a sifted key is estimated, one can guarantee the
secrecy of the corresponding final key, simply by ap-
plying an existing formula called the leftover hash-
ing lemma (LHL, or lemma 1 of this paper).
To the best of our knowledge, these two methods have
generally been considered independent of each other.
This is perhaps because mathematical relations between
them were not fully investigated. It now seems custom-
ary to publish two papers that prove the security of the
same QKD protocol by using each of the two approaches:
E.g., to name a few, for the asymptotic case of Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol [1] there are papers of the
PEC-based approach [6, 7] and of the LHL-based [11]; for
the finite-size case there are refs. [10] and [12]; for the
Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol [13] there are refs. [14] and
[11]. Empirically, however, obtained results are the same
for most problems of practical interest (e.g., the final key
rate for a given value of the security parameter ε), re-
gardless of the approach.
The goal of this paper is to show that these two ap-
proaches are in fact essentially the same. We demon-
strate this fact by presenting a direct connection between
these two approaches. That is, for QKD protocols in gen-
eral, we present an explicit procedure for converting a se-
curity proof of one approach to that of another approach.
We also show that the two approaches achieve the same
level of security; i.e., they give the same security bound
except for the presence of an inessential constant factor.
Thus hereafter, there is no need to publish two security
proofs for the same QKD protocol; one is enough.
We begin our analysis by considering privacy amplifi-
cation (PA) algorithms [15]. PA can be thought of as a
special case of QKD where the sender Alice alone gener-
ates a secret key in the absence of the receiver Bob. At
the same time, PA itself is an important building block
of cryptography, both classical and quantum (see, e.g.,
[15–17]). The LHL mentioned above is the standard the-
oretical tool used for guaranteeing its security [11, 15, 16].
For this algorithm, we show that (i) there exists a direct
connection between a PA algorithm and a certain quan-
tum phase error correction (PEC) algorithm, and (ii) the
LHL follows from a coding theorem of the quantum PEC
algorithm.
Then we generalize these results on PA to QKD, and
show that the same connection exists also for QKD pro-
tocols in general. That is, for QKD protocols in general,
we present an explicit procedure for converting a security
proof of the LHL-based approach to that of a PEC-based
approach, and vice versa. We also show that the obtained
security bounds are the same, except for the presence of
an inessential constant factor.
2II. REVIEW OF PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Privacy amplification (PA) [15] is a technique for ex-
tracting a completely private bit string, from a given bit
string which may be partially leaked outside. This can
also be viewed as a special case of QKD where Alice alone
generates a final key in the absence of Bob. In this section
we review the definition and the security of PA.
A. Definition
1. Initial state and algorithm
PA starts with a classical-quantum (cq) state
ρiniAE =
∑
a
|a〉〈a|A ⊗ ρini,aE , (1)
where bit string a ∈ {0, 1}n is owned by the legitimate
user (say, Alice), and states ρini,aE by the eavesdropper
Eve. Note that Eve may be able to obtain a certain
amount of information of string a by measuring ρini,aE ,
unless ρini,aE are all equal.
PA is a technique to extract from string a a random
string k which Eve cannot guess. More precisely, Alice
selects a random function g, and then calculates a shorter
string k = g(a). The idea is to realize the situation where
Eve’s state corresponding to k (ρfin,g,k of eq. (4) below)
are averaged, and less distinguishable than ρini,aE in the
initial state.
Actual PA scheme (Πap, ρini-ap)
Initial state: A sub-normalized cq state ρini-apAE .
Algorithm ΠapAKG:
1. Choice of hash function: Choose a random
function g and announce it publicly by writing
it in a Hilbert space HG.
2. Actual PA using hash function g (Πap,g):
(a) Measure space HA in the Z-basis to de-
termine the value of a.
(b) Calculate hash value k = g(a), and store
it in HK .
— We denote the final state by ρfin-ap
(=ρfin-apAEKG = Π
ap(ρini-ap)).
2. Terminology
We call a set of an algorithm and an initial state a
scheme.
Whenever we say a function g is random, (i) there are
a predetermined set of functions G = { g } (also called
function family G) as well as a predetermined probabil-
ity pG(g), and (ii) in an actual algorithm or protocol, a
legitimate player, Alice or Bob, selects g with probabil-
ity pG(g). In what follows, we often regard such g as a
random variable and denote it by capital G; in this case
the probability is written as pG(g) = Pr(G = g). All
random functions considered in this paper have the out-
put shorter than the input, and for this reason we often
call them random hash functions, and their output a hash
value.
3. Assumptions
Whenever we discuss a PA scheme, we impose the fol-
lowing assumptions. As to Hilbert spaces, HA and HK
are under Alice’s control, and HE is under Eve’s. HG is
a public space under both Alice’s and Eve’s control. As
to random hash functions, we assume:
• Functional forms of g and probability Pr(G = g)
are public.
• Functions g are of the form g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
with n ≥ m, and are linear and surjective.
Note that, from the first item, it is clear that the random-
ness and the secrecy of k are from those of the original
string a, not of g. We remark that the surjectivity of g
in the second item is solely for the sake of simplicity, and
all the results of this paper in fact hold without it.
B. Standard security criterion of PA (ε-secrecy)
In this and the next subsections, we abbreviate ρini-ap,
ρfin-ap as ρini, ρfin.
In the security analysis, we may focus on system
HKEG, because we are concerned with how much in-
formation of final key k is accessible from Eve through
her degrees of freedom HEG, and nothing else. By con-
struction of Πap, it is obvious that the reduced state
for HKEG corresponding to the final state ρfin, i.e.,
ρfinKEG = TrA(ρ
fin
KAEG), generally takes the form
ρfinKEG =
∑
g
Pr(G = g) ρfin,gKE ⊗ |g〉〈g|G, (2)
ρfin,gKE =
∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ ρfin,g,kE , (3)
ρfin,g,kE =
∑
a∈g−1(k)
ρini,aE . (4)
Note that ρfin,g can be interpreted either as the final state
conditioned on Alice’s choice g of a hash function (as in
eq. (2)), or as the result of applying operation Πpa,g (i.e.,
2 with g fixed) to the initial state; ρfin = Πpa,g(ρini).
3It is customary to measure the security of ρfinKEG by
comparing it with the ideal state. To this end, we define
the ideal state ρidealKEG corresponding to ρ
fin
KEG to be
ρidealKEG :=
∑
g
Pr(G = g) ρidealKE ⊗ |g〉〈g|G, (5)
ρidealKE := 2
−m
∑
k
|k〉〈k|K ⊗ ρE , (6)
ρE = TrKG(ρ
fin,g
KEG) = TrA(ρ
ini
AE) =
∑
a
ρini,aE . (7)
This state indeed describes the ideal situation where
Eve’s states corresponding to k, i.e., ρideal,kE = 2
−mρE ,
are all equal, and thus all values of k are equally proba-
ble to her.
We measure the security of k against Eve by the trace
distance ‖ · · · ‖1 between these actual and ideal states,
which we denote by
d1(ρ
fin
KEG) :=
∥∥ρfinKEG − ρidealKEG∥∥1 . (8)
A PA scheme is said to satisfy the ε-secrecy if the final
state satisfies d1(ρ
fin
KEG) ≤ ε. This security criterion is
known to satisfy the universal composability, and for this
reason, considered as the standard.
We note that d1(ρ
fin
KEG) can also be written as an av-
erage with respect to Alice’s choice of g
d1(ρ
fin
KEG) =
∑
g
Pr(G = g)d1(ρ
fin,g
KE ), (9)
d1(ρ
fin,g
KE ) :=
∥∥∥ρfin,gKE − ρidealKE ∥∥∥
1
. (10)
This form will be convenient in subsequent sections.
C. Existing result on the security (quantum
leftover hashing lemma)
Of various previous results on the security of PA, we
focus in this paper on Renner’s approach [11] using the
quantum leftover hashing lemma (LHL, or lemma 1 be-
low). The virtue of Renner’s approach is its simplicity;
once one obtains a lower bound of the minimum entropy
Hεmin(ρ
ini
AE |E) of the initial state ρiniAE , the rest of the ar-
gument is finished almost automatically, by substituting
it to the LHL. We briefly review this result below.
The minimum entropy Hmin(ρAE |E) of a sub-
normalized state ρAE is defined to be the maximum real
number λ, satisfying
2−λIA ⊗ σE ≥ ρAE (11)
for a normalized state σE [11, 18]. Further, the smooth
minimum entropy Hεmin(ρAE |E) of a sub-normalized
state ρAE is the maximum value of Hmin(ρ¯AE |E) of sub-
normalized states ρ¯AE that are ε-close to ρAE (ρ¯AE ≈ε
ρAE) [18];
Hεmin(ρAE |E) := max
Trρ¯AE≤1,
ρ¯AE≈ερAE
Hmin(ρ¯AE |E). (12)
(for details of ε-closeness, see appendix A or ref. [18]).
A random hash function G is called universal2 or two-
universal [19], if the collision probability of outputs of
any distinct input pair a, a′ (a 6= a′) is bounded as
Pr(G(a) = G(a′)) =
∑
g
Pr(G = g)1[g(a) = g(a′)]
≤ 2−m, (13)
where function 1[· · · ] takes value one if the condition in-
side brackets hold, and zero otherwise.
With these settings, one can bound d1(ρ
fin
KEG) of (8)
by using the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Quantum leftover hashing lemma (LHL)
(chapter 5, ref. [11])). If random hash function G is
universal2, the security of PA scheme Π
ap is guaranteed
by
d1(ρ
fin
KEG) ≤ 2
1
2
[m−Hmin(ρ
ini
AE |E)], (14)
and in terms of the smooth minimum entropy,
d1(ρ
fin
KEG) ≤ 2ε+ 2
1
2
[m−Hεmin(ρ
ini
AE |E)]. (15)
A proof of lemma 1 is given in chapter 5 of Renner’s
Ph.D. thesis [11]. In that thesis, Renner first bounds the
1-norm, d1 defined in (10), by the corresponding 2-norm
d2. Then he averages d2 with respect to G and suppresses
unwanted terms by exploiting the universal2 property of
hash function G, so that it is bounded by the right hand
side of (14).
III. LEFTOVER HASHING LEMMA AS A
CODING THEOREM OF QUANTUM PHASE
ERROR CORRECTION
In this section, we prove essentially the same result as
the LHL, by using a method different from the original
paper. In other words, we prove inequalities which are
identical to (14) and (15) except for an inessential con-
stant factor, without relying on the results of ref [11]. In
what follows, we will often call our version of inequalities
(14) and (15) the LHL-like bounds.
The proof proceeds in two steps: (i) we present a direct
connection between the actual PA algorithm Πap and a
certain quantum phase error correction (PEC) algorithm,
and (ii) we obtain the LHL-like bounds as a consequence
of the coding theorem of the PEC. More precisely, in step
(i), we show that, without loss of security (i.e., without
affecting the value of d1(ρ
fin
KEG)), we can modify the ac-
tual PA algorithm Πap to another algorithm Πvp, which
has a PEC algorithm embedded inside. Then in step
(ii), we show that the security criterion, d1(ρ
fin
KEG), can
be bounded from above by the failure probability of the
PEC algorithm. As a result of this, the LHL-like bound
is obtained as a corollary of a coding theorem of the PEC.
This section can be regarded as a special case of our
discussion on quantum key distribution (QKD), given in
4the next section. Recall that PA can be interpreted as a
special case of QKD where Alice alone generates a final
key in the absence of Bob. Then the argument below can
be viewed as converting the LHL-based security proof of
PA (i.e., the LHL itself) to the PEC-based security proof.
A. Notation
From now on, we assume that bras and kets indexed
by a bit string are all eigenstates of the Pauli operator Z;
e.g., for z ∈ {0, 1}n, Zz′ |z〉 = (−1)z′·z |z〉. We also de-
note Fourier transforms of these Z-eigenstates by adding
a tilde:
|x˜〉 = 2−s/2
∑
z
(−1)x·z |z〉 , for x ∈ {0, 1}n. (16)
Note that these are eigenstates the Pauli operatorX ; i.e.,
Xx
′ |x˜〉 = (−1)x′·x |x˜〉. We will often call |z〉 the bit basis,
and |x˜〉 the phase basis, following the convention of quan-
tum information theory. For more details of notation, see
appendix A.
B. Conversion to a virtual PA scheme
As we have seen in the previous section, the only goal
of the security proof of PA is to upper bound d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG),
for ρfin-apKEG defined in section IIA and d1(· · · ) defined in
eq. (8). In carrying out this analysis, one looses no
generality by considering any scheme, if its final state
equals ρfin-apKEG of the actual scheme, when one looks only
at system HKEG. More precisely, we use the following
definition:
Definition 1 (Virtual PA schemes). We say that a PA
scheme (Π′, ρini′) is virtual, if the reduced state ρfin′KEG
for system HKEG corresponding to its final state ρfin′ =
Π′(ρini′) equals ρfin-apKEG .
Here, ρfin-apKEG is the reduced state forHKEG correspond-
ing to ρfin-apKEG of the actual scheme (Π
ap, ρini-ap). Intu-
itively, the output of a virtual scheme is exactly the same
as that of the actual scheme, if one looks only at system
HKEG. Hence if one wishes to prove the security of the
actual scheme (Πap, ρini-ap) by bounding d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG), it
suffices instead to bound d1(ρ
fin′
KEG) with ρ
fin′
KEG being the
output of an arbitrary virtual scheme (Π′, ρini′).
The advantage of considering such virtual schemes is
that, with an appropriate of choice of (Π′, ρ′), one can
simplify the mathematical proposition that needs to be
proved. Also, as a result of that, one can even simplify
the proof itself. We stress that virtual schemes are used
only as a theoretical tool that is useful in this sense, and
one never needs to care how to realize them in practice.
Below we construct an example of virtual schemes by
modifying the actual scheme (Πap, ρini-ap) in three steps.
Note that indeed none of these changes affects the corre-
sponding final state ρfinKEG in HKEG.
1. Preparing a purification
The initial cq state ρini-apAE may be replaced with its pu-
rification |Ψini-ap〉AEA′ , with HA′ being an ancilla space
under Alice’s control.
2. PA as the bit basis measurements
Since hash function g ∈ G is linear and surjective (see
the third paragraph of section IIA), the i-th bit of k can
be represented ki = gi · a with a set of linearly indepen-
dent vectors g1, . . . , gm ∈ {0, 1}n. Hence step 2 of ΠapA is
equivalent to measuring eigenvalues (−1)ki of operators
Z¯i := Z
gi , i = 1, . . . ,m, (17)
i.e., Z¯i |a〉 = Zgi |a〉 = (−1)gi·a |a〉 = (−1)ki |a〉. We will
often call this step the bit basis measurement.
3. Quantum error correcting code PCg defined from hash
function g
Define a classical error correcting code Cg to be
Cg := (ker g)⊥, i.e., a linear code having generating
matrix g = (gT1 , . . . , g
T
m)
T . Select a check matrix h =
(hT1 , . . . , h
T
n−m)
T . By definition, h is an (n−m)×n ma-
trix satisfying hgT = 0.
Then from this classical code, Cg, define a quantum er-
ror correcting code PCg by embedding in phase degrees
of freedom of HA; i.e., PCg is a quantum code character-
ized by a code space spanned by a basis { |x˜〉 |x ∈ Cg },
and syndrome operators
X¯j := X
hj , j = 1, . . . , n−m. (18)
Note that Z¯i and X¯j commute with each other due
to hgT = 0. We note that PCg is the Hadamard-
transform of a classical code having codewords in the
bit basis { |x〉 |x ∈ Cg }; thus PCg corrects only phase
errors, not bit errors. For this reason, we will often call
PCg a phase error correcting code. We also note that
PCg can alternatively be defined as a Calderbank-Shor-
Steane (CSS) code corresponding to a classical code pair
(C1, C2) = ({0, 1}n, ker g), in the notation of ref. [2]. In
this terminology, Z¯i and X¯j are the logical Z operators
and the stabilizers of the CSS code, respectively.
Since Z¯i and X¯j commute, syndrome measurements
with X¯j may be inserted before bit basis measurements
with Z¯i. Also for the same reason, we may also insert
arbitrary measurements in HA′ , and phase flip operation
using Zi, after the syndrome measurement and before the
bit basis measurement.
4. Virtual PA scheme
By applying these three changes to the actual PA
scheme (Πap, ρini-ap), we obtain virtual PA scheme
5(Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉), described below.
Virtual PA scheme (Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉)
Initial state: A purification |Ψini-ap〉AEA′ of a sub-
normalized cq state ρini-apAE .
Algorithm ΠvpA|G|A′ :
1. Choice of hash function:
Choose g ∈ G with probability Pr(G = g)
and announce it publicly by writing it in Eve’s
space HG.
2. Virtual PA using phase error correcting
code PCg (Πvp,gA|A′):
(a) Phase error correction Πpec,gA|A′ :
i. Syndrome measurement:
Obtain syndrome s = (s1, . . . , sn−m)
∈ {0, 1}n−m of PCg by measuring
eigenvalues (−1)s1 , . . . , (−1)sn−m of
operators X¯1,. . . ,X¯n−m in HA,
ii. Ancilla measurement:
Determine phase error e ∈ {0, 1}n
by measuring ancilla space HA′
with an operator set Mg,s =
{Eg,s,eA′ | e ∈ {0, 1}n}, satisfying∑
e∈{0,1}n E
g,s,e†Eg,s,e = IA′ .
iii. Phase flip:
Flip phases by applying Ze in HA.
— We denote the state here by ρpec-vp.
(b) Bit basis measurement: Measure
eigenvalues (−1)k1 , . . . , (−1)km of opera-
tors Z¯1, · · · , Z¯m in HA, and store hash
value k = (k1, . . . , km) ∈ {0, 1}m in HK .
— We denote the final state by ρfin-vp.
The following property is evident from the construc-
tion.
Lemma 2.
ρfin-vpKEG = ρ
fin-ap
KEG , (19)
and thus the scheme above, (Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉), is indeed vir-
tual.
Recall that the security proof of PA is to show
d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG) ≤ ε, with ρfin-apKEG being the final state of the
actual scheme (Πap, ρini-ap). Also note that the above
lemma gives d1(ρ
fin-vp
KEG) = d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG). Hence, if one
wishes to prove the security of the actual scheme, it suf-
fices instead to show d1(ρ
fin-vp
KEG) ≤ ε for the output ρfin-vpKEG
of the virtual scheme (Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉).
Note that the use of random hash function g in the
actual scheme has now been translated to phase error
correction Πpec,g using random code PCg (followed by
the Z-basis measurement in step 2(b)). We will see
below that the security of the PA scheme d1(ρ
fin-vp
KEG)
(= d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG)) is also translated to the performance of
the random error correction Πpec,g.
Before going on, we give a technical remark. The phase
error correction algorithm Πpec,g is in fact generalized
from those typically found in textbooks, such as ref. [2],
in the following two senses.
• In guessing phase error e, Alice exploits a result
of an ancilla measurement in HA′ , in addition to
syndrome s; i.e., Alice can access an extra hint by
measuring HA′ .
• Operator setMg,s for the ancilla measurement may
depend on syndrome s found in the previous step;
i.e., Alice has a freedom to optimize her measure-
ment strategy Mg,s adaptively after knowing s, in
order to better determine e.
C. Reducing the security to the performance of
quantum phase error correction
Next we illustrate that the security of the virtual PA
scheme (and thus also of the actual scheme) can be re-
duced to the performance of the phase error correction
Πpec embedded inside Πvp.
From the structure of the virtual scheme, it is evident
that the result of Πpec, i.e. ρpec-vp, takes the form
ρpec-vpAA′EG =
∑
g
Pr(G = g)ρpec-vp,gAA′E ⊗ |g〉 〈g|G , (20)
ρpec-vp,gAA′E := Π
pec,g
A|A′
(|Ψini-ap〉 〈Ψini-ap|AA′E) . (21)
That is, ρpec-vp,g is the case of fixed g, and ρpec-vp the
average with respect to randomly chosen g. Below we
discuss these two cases in detail.
1. Case of fixed g
Whenever we discuss phase error correction in this pa-
per, we regard |0˜〉 as the correct phase that should be
recovered, and all other phases as errors. Accordingly,
we evaluate the performance of Πpec,g by the phase error
probability in HA
P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) = 1− 〈0˜|A ρpec-vp,gA |0˜〉A , (22)
with ρpec-vp,gA being the reduced state for HA correspond-
ing to ρpec-vp,g; i.e., ρpec-vp,gA = TrEA′(ρ
pec-vp,g
AA′E ). We will
also call this probability the failure probability of Πpec,g.
It has been known that P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) can be used to
give an upper bound on d1(ρ
fin-vp,g
KE ), i.e., the security
measure of hash value k obtained in the subsequent bit
6basis measurement, against Eve (see, e.g., ref. [20]). For
example, consider a simple situation where the phase er-
ror probability of the initial |Ψini-ap〉 is sufficiently low,
and Πpec,g always succeeds: P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) = 0. Then
Alice’s substate is a pure state with a definite phase,
ρpec-vp,gA = |0˜〉 〈0˜|A, and so Alice’s and Eve’s joint state
must be a tensor product ρpec-vp,gAE = |0˜〉 〈0˜|A⊗ρE, which
subsequently becomes ρfin-vp,gKE = ρ
ideal-vp
KE after Z¯i mea-
surements of step 3; here ρideal-vpKE is the ideal state cor-
responding to ρfin-vp,gKE . Hence a perfect error correction
Πpec,g, achieving P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) = 0, implies the perfect
security d1(ρ
fin-vp,g
KE ) = 0. This observation has been ex-
tended to the general case including P ph > 0 as
d1(ρ
fin-vp,g
KE ) ≤ 2
√
2
√
P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g). (23)
Although inequality (23) is a well-known result (see, e.g.,
ref. [20]), we reproduce the proof in appendix C for read-
ers’ convenience. Note that, due to the virtuality of the
virtual PA scheme (lemma 2), inequality (23) also implies
a bound for the actual scheme
d1(ρ
fin-ap,g
KE ) ≤ 2
√
2
√
P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g). (24)
2. Case of randomly chosen g
When hash function g is chosen randomly, we have to
consider d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG) =
∑
g Pr(G = g)d1(ρ
fin-ap,g
KE ), given in
eqs. (8) and (9). By combining relations (9) and (24) and
by applying Jensen’s inequality (square root is a concave
function), we can bound d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG) as
d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG)
=
∑
g
Pr(G = g)d1(ρ
fin-ap,g
KE )
≤ 2
√
2
√∑
g
Pr(G = g)P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g). (25)
This means that, in order to bound the secrecy measure
d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG) of the actual PA scheme (Π
ap, ρini-ap), it suf-
fices to bound the average failure probability
∑
g Pr(G =
g)P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) of the phase error correction algorithm
Πpec,g, embedded inside virtual PA algorithm Πvp.
D. LHL-like bound derived from a coding theorem
of phase error correction
Now, if we recall the LHL (lemma 1) and compare in-
equalities (14) and (25), we see that both the exponential
minimum entropy 2
1
2
[m−Hmin(ρ
ini
AE |E)] and the square root
failure probability 2
√
2
√∑
g Pr(G = g)P
ph
A (ρ
pec-vp,g) of
error correction Πpec,g are an upper bound on the same
quantity, d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG). In addition to that, as we have seen
in section III B, these two quantities are related by quan-
tum operations: ρpec-vp,g is obtained by applying Πpec,g
to a purification |Ψini-ap〉 of ρini-apAE ; see the description
of virtual PA Πvp,g and eq. (21). Thus it is natural to
suspect that these two quantities may actually be equal,
or at least comparable to each other.
Theorem 1 below is our answer to this question. This
theorem essentially says that, if we disregard a constant
factor 2
√
2, inequality (25) is stronger than (14), i.e.,
the quantity on the right hand side of (25) can always
be bounded from above by that of (14). Interestingly,
this relation can be interpreted as a coding theorem for
our phase error correction Πpec,g that bounds the aver-
age failure probability of Πpec,g in terms of the minimum
entropy Hmin(ρ
ini-ap
AE |E) of the initial state ρini-apAE :
Theorem 1 (Coding theorem of the quantum phase er-
ror correction Πpec,g). Under the setting of virtual PA
scheme (Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉), let random hash function G be
universal2. Then with an appropriate choice of the an-
cilla measurementMg,s, the average failure probability of
Πpec,g can be bounded as∑
g
Pr(G = g)P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) ≤ 2m−Hmin(ρini-apAE |E).(26)
We will prove this theorem in appendix B. To reiterate,
the magnitude of the minimum entropy Hmin(ρ
ini-ap
AE |E)
does not only guarantee the effectiveness of the leftover
hashing lemma, but also that of phase error correction
Πpec,g, embedded in Πvp. It is so effective that if one
substitutes inequality (26) to (25), one can reproduce
the LHL for the non-smoothed case.
Corollary 1 (Quantum LHL-like bound derived from
the coding theorem). Under the setting of virtual PA
scheme (Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉), if random hash function G is
universal2, we have from (25) and (26),
d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG) ≤ 2
√
2
√∑
g
Pr(G = g)P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g)
≤ 2
√
2 2
1
2 [m−Hmin(ρ
ini-ap
AE |E)]
= 2
1
2 [m−Hmin(ρ
ini-ap
AE |E)+3]. (27)
This bound is slightly looser than (14), by the fac-
tor of 2
√
2, but we consider this difference as inessential
because in practice it can easily be compensated for by
shortening length m of hash value k by three bits.
The discussion above can be considered as an alterna-
tive proof of the LHL, obtained by utilizing the PEC-
based approach; as PA scheme Πap can be considered as
a special case of QKD where Alice alone generates a final
key in the absence of Bob.
E. Generalizations
We present two types of generalization of the above
results.
71. Case of smooth minimum entropy
Corollary 1 can be generalized for the smooth mini-
mum entropy.
Corollary 2 (Smoothed quantum LHL-like bound de-
rived from the coding theorem). Under the setting of vir-
tual PA scheme (Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉), if random hash function
G is universal2, we have
d1(ρ
fin-ap
KEG) ≤ 2ε+ 2
1
2 [m−H
ε
min(ρ
ini-ap
AE |E)+3]. (28)
The proof is essentially the same as in corollary 5.6.1.
of ref. [11], but we write it out below to demonstrate that
it can be proved entirely within our argument using phase
error correction. Note that in this proof the appropriate
strategy Mg,s for an ancilla measurement is described
explicitly.
Proof. By definition of the smooth minimum entropy in
eq. (12), there exists a sub-normalized state ρ¯ini-apAE sat-
isfying ‖ρ¯ini-apAE − ρini-apAE ‖1 ≤ P (ρ¯ini-apAE , ρiniAE) ≤ ε and
Hεmin(ρ
ini-ap
AE |E) = Hmin(ρ¯ini-apAE |E). We denote the re-
sults of applying the actual PA algorithm Πap,g to ρini-ap
and ρ¯ini-ap by ρfin-ap,g and ρ¯fin-ap,g respectively; i.e.,
ρfin-ap,g = Πap,g(ρini-ap), ρ¯fin-ap,g = Πap,g(ρ¯ini-ap). Also,
we denote their ideal states by ρidealKE and ρ¯
ideal
KE , respec-
tively (cf. section II B).
In this setting, by using the triangle inequality of the
trace distance, d1(ρ
fin-ap,g
KE ) can be bounded as
d1(ρ
fin-ap,g
KE )
=
∥∥∥ρfin-ap,gKE − ρidealKE ∥∥∥
1
≤
∥∥∥ρfin-ap,gKE − ρ¯fin-ap,gKE ∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥ρ¯fin-ap,gKE − ρ¯idealKE ∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥ρ¯idealKE − ρidealKE ∥∥1
=
∥∥∥ρfin-ap,gKE − ρ¯fin-ap,gKE ∥∥∥
1
+ d1
(
ρ¯fin-ap,gKE
)
+
∥∥ρ¯idealKE − ρidealKE ∥∥1 . (29)
The first and the third terms on the right
hand side of (29) can each be bounded by
ε: By definition of the ideal states, we have∥∥ρ¯idealKE − ρidealKE ∥∥1 ≤ ∥∥∥ρfin-ap,gKE − ρ¯fin-ap,gKE ∥∥∥1. Since
Πap,g is a CPTP map, the quantities on the right hand
side can be further bounded as
∥∥∥ρfin-ap,gKE − ρ¯fin-ap,gKE ∥∥∥
1
≤∥∥Πap,g(ρini-ap)−Πap,g(ρ¯ini-ap)∥∥
1
≤
∥∥ρini-ap − ρ¯ini-ap∥∥
1
≤
ε.
Next we bound d1
(
ρ¯fin-ap,gKE
)
on the right hand side
of (29). Choose an arbitrary purification of ρ¯ini-apAE and
denote it by |Ψ¯ini-ap〉. Then from lemma 2, it fol-
lows that d1
(
ρ¯fin-ap,gKE
)
= d1
(
ρ¯fin-vp,gKE
)
with ρ¯fin-vp,g =
Πvp,g(|Ψ¯ini-ap〉 〈Ψ¯ini-ap|). Also choose the ancilla mea-
surement Mg,s in the virtual PA algorithm Πvp,g, such
that inequality (26) of theorem 1 holds for |Ψ¯ini-ap〉 and
ρ¯ini-ap. Then corollary 1 can be applied, and the aver-
age of d1
(
ρ¯fin-ap,gKE
)
= d1
(
ρ¯fin-vp,gKE
)
with respect to the
random choice of g can be bounded as∑
g
Pr(G = g)d1
(
ρfin-ap,gKE
)
(30)
≤ 2 12 (m+3−Hmin(ρ¯ini-apAE |E)) = 2 12 (m+3−Hεmin(ρini-apAE |E)).
Then by using eq. (9), we obtain the lemma.
2. Semi-purification and twirling
Thus far we always assumed that the initial state of
the virtual PA is a purification |Ψini-ap〉 of the initial cq
state ρini-apAE . However, as we will see in our discussion on
QKD in the next section, it is useful to consider a larger
class of inputs that we call semi-purifications:
Definition 2 (Semi-purification). We say that a pure
state |Φ〉AEA′ is a semi-purification of a cq state ρAE
with respect to HA, if its reduced state for HAE
(i.e., TrA′ (|Φ〉 〈Φ|)) equals ρAE after being measured
in the Z basis of HA. That is, |Φ〉AEA′ is a
semi-purification, if ρAE = Π
Z-mea
A (TrA′ {|Φ〉 〈Φ|}) =∑
z |z〉 〈z|ATrA′ {|Φ〉 〈Φ|} |z〉 〈z|A (see appendix A for de-
tails of the definition of ΠZ-mea).
It is obvious from this definition that purifications are
a special case of semi-purifications. We note that this
larger class of states can always be converted to a purifi-
cation by the following simple operation, which we call
twirling.
Definition 3 (Twirling). Twirling operation ΠtwA|A′ con-
sists of two steps: i) add an ancilla |0〉 〈0|A′ , and then ii)
apply CNOT gate ΠcnotA|A′ =
∑
z |z〉 〈z|A⊗XzA′ (again, see
appendix A for details of the definition of ΠcnotA|A′).
Lemma 3. If |Φ〉 is a semi-purification of a cq state
ρAE, then |Ψ〉 = ΠtwA|A′′(|Φ〉) = ΠcnotA|A′′(|Φ〉 ⊗ |0〉A′′) is a
purification.
We omit the proof since it is quite straightforward. By
inserting this operation at the beginning of virtual PA
Πvp, we can construct the following scheme.
Virtual PA scheme with twirling (Πvpt, |Φini-ap〉)
Initial state:
A semi-purification |Φini-ap〉AA′E of a cq state
ρini-apAE .
Algorithm ΠvptA|G|A′|A′′ :
1. Twirling:
Apply ΠtwA|A′′ , described in definition 3.
8— We denote the result by |Ψtw-vpt〉AA′A′′E .
2. Virtual PA: Apply ΠvpA|G|A′A′′ , described in
section III B 4.
— We denote the result by ρfin-vpt
(= ρfin-vptKAA′A′′EG).
The following properties are obvious from the construc-
tion:
Lemma 4. |Ψtw-vpt〉AA′A′′E is a purification of ρini-apAE .
Also,
ρfin-vptKEG = ρ
fin-ap
KEG , (31)
and thus the scheme above, (Πvpt, |Φini-ap〉), is indeed vir-
tual.
Hence the situation in step 2 of (Πvpt, |Φini-ap〉) is
equivalent to that of the virtual scheme (Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉)
of section III B. This means that all the results obtained
in this section hold also for (Πvpt, |Φini-ap〉), including
theorem 1 and corollaries 1 and 2.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE SECURITY
PROOF OF QKD
Next we apply our results on privacy amplification
(PA), obtained in the previous section, to quantum key
distribution (QKD).
As mentioned in section I, there are two major ap-
proaches to the security proof of QKD, which are gener-
ally considered independent of each other: (i) The PEC-
based approach, or the Mayers-Shor-Preskill approach
[6, 7]: This is essentially the same as our argument us-
ing the virtual PA scheme, given in the previous sec-
tion. One constructs a virtual QKD protocol which has
a phase error correction (PEC) algorithm embedded in-
side. The security analysis of the final key is then reduced
to bounding the failure probability of the PEC. (ii) The
LHL-based approach, or Renner’s approach [11], which
uses the leftover hashing lemma (LHL), lemma 1 of this
paper.
In the previous section, we considered PA scheme Πap,
which can be thought of as a special case of QKD where
Alice alone generates a final key in the absence of Bob.
For this special case, we have shown that there is a direct
connection between the two approaches of the security
proof; i.e., we proved essentially the same results as the
LHL only by using the PEC-based approach. Below we
show that such connection also exists for QKD. That is,
for QKD protocols in general, we present an explicit pro-
cedure for converting a security proof of one approach
to that of another approach. We also show that the ob-
tained security bounds are the same, except for the pres-
ence of an inessential constant factor. This result shows
that these two approaches are essentially the same.
The idea is to simply apply our result of the previous
section on PA to QKD. We replace an actual PA algo-
rithm embedded inside a QKD protocol with the virtual
PA defined in the previous section, and as a result, obtain
a virtual QKD protocol with a virtual PEC embedded in-
side.
However, there are apparent obstacles in carrying out
this idea: (a) The security criteria of PA and QKD are
different; i.e., in addition to the secrecy required by PA,
QKD also requires the correctness (see section IVB1).
(b) In our argument of the virtual PA scheme, we always
assumed that the initial state is a purification or a semi-
purification of cq state ρAE , with H
ε
min(ρAE |E) being
bounded from below, but this assumption of semi-purity
may not be true for QKD. For example, each player may
generate mixed at any stage of the protocol.
Below we demonstrate that we can indeed overcome
these obstacles and complete the conversions between the
two approaches, by writing down every step of the con-
version explicitly.
A. General QKD scheme
1. Definition
As in the previous sections, we call a set consist-
ing of an initial state ρini and a QKD protocol Π a
QKD scheme (Π, ρini). In discussions below, we restrict
ourselves to actual QKD schemes having the structure
(Πaq, ρini-aq) specified below. To the best of our knowl-
edge, all practical QKD schemes known at the present
(e.g., [1, 13, 21, 22]) can be described as a specific case
of this scheme (for detailed argument on the generality
of this scheme, see section IVA3).
Actual QKD scheme (Πaq, ρini-aq)
Initial state:
A mixed state ρini-aq (= ρini-aqA′EB′).
Protocol Πaq:
1. Sample measurement:
Alice and Bob measure HA′ and HB′ respec-
tively. They then discuss their measurement
results over a public channel and decide if they
abort or continue the protocol.
2. Sifted key measurement:
Alice (respectively, Bob) again measures HA′
(respectively, HB′) to obtain sifted key a (b),
stores it in HA (HB) in the Z-basis.
— Hence the result is classical in HA and
HB. We denote this state by ρsif-aq
(= ρsif-aqABA′EB′).
93. Key Distillation:
(a) Information Reconciliation:
i. Error correction:
Alice and Bob communicate using en-
cryption. Bob then corrects bit errors
in b and obtain the corrected key bcor.
ii. Verification:
Alice chooses a universal2 function u :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}l and announces the
choice publicly by writing it in HE .
Alice calculates u(a), encrypts it, and
sends it to Bob. Bob then decrypts it
and checks if u(a) = u(bcor); if not,
they return to step i above.
For details on the encryption used here,
see section IVA2.
(b) Privacy amplification:
Alice chooses a universal2 hash function
g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m and announces the
choice publicly by writing it in HG. Al-
ice (respectively, Bob) calculates final key
k = g(a) (respectively, k′ = g(bcor)) and
stores it in HK (HK′).
— We denote the final state by ρfin-aq
(=ρfin-aqKK′GABA′B′E).
The purpose of each step is as follows. The sample
measurement step selects out states that have a certain
desirable property, i.e., the types of properties which en-
sure the final keys extracted later by PA are secure. In
the actual scheme, they do this selection by continuing
the protocol only when a subsystem (i.e., samples) of the
initial state passes a predetermined test. The error cor-
rection step aims to correct bit errors in Bob’s sifted key
due to noise in the channel. Then the verification step
verifies that the key is indeed corrected.
2. Assumptions
We continue to impose the assumptions of section
IIA 3 for PA schemes, and also add the following assump-
tions.
As to Hilbert spaces, HA′K is under Alice’s control,
and HBB′K′ is under Bob’s; HA, HB are n-qubit spaces,
and HK , HK′ are m-qubit. As to encryptions in step
3.(a), Alice and Bob use the one-time pad with pre-
shared secret keys, e.g., final keys obtained in previous
QKD sessions as secret keys.
There are also assumptions on the sample measure-
ment of step 2, but we do not specify them yet; instead
we specify them in sections IVD and IVE, where we dis-
cuss the security proofs. This is because these assump-
tions depend strongly on the approaches taken in the
security proofs (i.e., the LHL-based and the PEC-based
approaches), and thus it is appropriate to specify them
at the moment of each proof.
3. Remarks on the generality of our actual scheme
We note that any practical QKD protocol known at the
present (e.g., [1, 13, 21, 22]) can be rewritten in the above
form without affecting the results of a security proof (i.e.,
without affecting the security measure D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) de-
fined in eq. (37)) by the following procedures.
• If any of the players, Alice, Bob, or Eve, uses a
classical random variable R, we include it in the
initial state ρini-ap, and let him or her measure it
later; for example,
– It is possible that the original protocol uses
a one-way quantum communication, instead
of an entangled state ρini-apA′EB′ generated by
Eve. That is, it is possible that the proto-
col starts with Alice’s state ρAlice,rA′E occurring
with probability Pr(R = r), and it then under-
goes Eve’s attack ΠEve and becomes ρrA′EB′ =
ΠEve(ρAlice,rA′E ). In such case we rewrite the ini-
tial state ρini-apRA′EB′ =
∑
r Pr(R = r) |r〉 〈r|R ⊗
ρrA′EB′ , and then let Alice measure r projec-
tively in step 2. We also redefine space HA′R
to be HA′ , to simplify notation.
– Similarly, if Alice performs different measure-
ments depending on r, i.e., if she uses differ-
ent POVMs M r = {mr,i | i } with probability
Pr(R = r), we replace the initial state with
ρRAA′EB′ =
∑
r Pr(R = r) |r〉 〈r|R ⊗ ρAA′EB′ ,
and let her use POVM M = { |r〉 〈r|R ⊗
mr,i | r, i }. We also redefine space HA′R to
be HA′ .
• If Alice or Bob publicly announces pieces of infor-
mation during the protocol in step 1, we assume
that they do so by writing them in Eve’s space HE .
B. Definition of the security
1. Standard security criterion of QKD (ε-security)
In this subsection, we often abbreviate ρini-aq, ρfin-aq
as ρini, ρfin.
The goal of the security analysis of QKD is to guar-
antee that, except with a negligible probability, (i) Al-
ice’s and Bob’s final keys k, k′ in HKK′ are uniformly
distributed over {0, 1}m, and (ii) k, k′ are not accessi-
ble by Eve through HEG. Hence in defining the secu-
rity criteria, we may focus on ρfin-aqKK′EG, the reduced state
for HKK′EG corresponding to ρfin-aq in , i.e., ρfin-aqKK′EG =
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TrAA′BB′
(
ρfin-aq
)
= TrAA′BB′
(
Πaq
(
ρfin-aq
))
. As to the
quantitative definition of “except with a negligible proba-
bility”, it is customary to use an approach similar to that
used in section II B for the case of PA. That is, one de-
fines the ideal state ρidealKK′EG corresponding to ρ
fin-aq
KK′EG,
and then evaluate the trace distance between ρidealKK′EG
and ρfin-aqKK′EG. The details are as follows.
By definition of Πaq, it is evident that ρfinKK′EG (=
ρfin-aqKK′EG) generally takes the form
ρfinKK′EG =
∑
g
Pr(G = g)ρfin,gKK′E ⊗ |g〉 〈g|G , (32)
ρfin,gKK′E =
∑
k,k′
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ |k′〉 〈k′|K′ ⊗ ρfin,g,k,k
′
E . (33)
Corresponding to this state, the ideal state is defined to
be
ρidealKK′EG :=
∑
g
Pr(G = g)ρidealKK′E ⊗ |g〉 〈g|G , (34)
ρidealKK′E :=
∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ |k〉 〈k|K′ ⊗ 2−mρfinE , (35)
ρfinE = TrKK′G(ρ
fin
KK′EG)
=
∑
g
Pr(G = g)
∑
k,k′
ρfin,g,k,k
′
E . (36)
Note that ρidealKK′EG indeed embodies the two conditions
for the ideal situation, mentioned in the previous para-
graph.
Then we measure the security of QKD protocols by the
trace distance ‖ · · · ‖1 between these two states; i.e., we
use the definition of
• ε-security: A QKD protocol is said to be ε-secure,
if D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) ≤ ε, where
D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) :=
∥∥ρfinKK′EG − ρidealKK′EG∥∥1 . (37)
As in the case of PA, this security criteria is known to sat-
isfy the universal composability [23], and for this reason,
it is considered the standard.
2. Separation of the secrecy and the correctness
Hence the goal of a security proof of QKD is to prove
D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) ≤ ε. Next we show that this task can fur-
ther be reduced to proving the secrecy of Alice’s final
key k alone (corollary 3). The key observation is that
D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) ≤ ε can be divided into a set of simpler
conditions. Consider the following two conditions [11]:
• ε′-secrecy of Alice’s final key alone (disregarding
Bob’s) against Eve: That is, d1(ρ
fin
KEG) ≤ ε′, where
d1(· · · ) is the trace distance defined in section II B,
and ρfinKEG is the reduced state for HKEG corre-
sponding to ρfin.
• ε′′-correctness: Alice’s and Bob’s final keys
k, k′ agree except for probability ε′′; i.e.,
Pr
(
K 6= K ′ ∧ ρfin) ≤ ε′′, where
Pr
(
K 6= K ′ ∧ ρfin)
:=
∑
k,k′
k 6=k′
Tr
{
(|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ |k′〉 〈k′|K′) ρfinKK′
}
, (38)
with ρfinKK′ being the reduced state for HKK′ cor-
responding to ρfin.
Then D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) can be bounded as follows.
Lemma 5 (Separation of the secrecy and the correct-
ness).
D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) ≤ d1(ρfinKEG)+2Pr
(
K 6= K ′ ∧ ρfin) . (39)
E.g., the ε′-secrecy and the ε′′-correctness imply the
ε-security with ε = ε′ + 2ε′′. The proof of this lemma is
quite straightforward (see appendix D of this paper, or
section 6.1 of ref. [11]). Furthermore, if we recall that the
verification function u of step 3.(a).ii is universal2, the ε
′′-
correctness can be guaranteed automatically. That is, by
using eq. (13), the definition of the universal2 property,
we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 6 (Bound on the correctness by using universal2
function).
Pr
(
K 6= K ′ ∧ ρfin)
≤ Pr (A 6= Bcor ∧ U(A) = U(Bcor)) ≤ 2−l. (40)
By combining these two lemmas, we finally obtain
Corollary 3 (Security bounded by the secrecy).
D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) ≤ d1(ρfinKEG) + 2−l+1. (41)
C. Conversion to virtual QKD schemes
Hence the security proof of QKD is now reduced to
proving d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG) ≤ ε′. Then we can apply the technique
of virtual schemes, which we used for PA in section III B.
For the present case of QKD, we define virtual schemes
as follows:
Definition 4 (Virtual QKD schemes). We say that a
QKD scheme (Π′, ρini′) is virtual, if ρfin′KEG, the reduced
state for HKEG corresponding to the final state ρfin′ :=
Πaq(ρini′), equals that of the actual scheme, ρfin-aqKEG.
Thus, as in the case of PA, if one wishes to prove the
security of the actual scheme (Πaq, ρini-aq), it suffices in-
stead to prove d1(ρ
fin′
KEG) ≤ ε′ for an arbitrary virtual
scheme (Π′, ρini′).
Below we modify the actual (Πaq, ρini-aq) step by step,
and construct three virtual schemes. The first virtual
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scheme has the actual PA embedded inside. In section
IVD1, we will see that it allows us to prove d1(ρ
fin′
KEG) ≤
ε′ (and thus d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG) ≤ ε′) by using the LHL. On the
other hand, the third scheme has virtual PEC embedded
inside. In section IVD 2, we will see that it allows us to
prove the security using the PEC.
1. Omission of Bob’s operations
Suppose that Bob gives up all his operations after step
2 in Πaq, then the actual scheme (Πaq, ρini-aq) becomes
(Πvq1, ρini-aq) given below.
Virtual QKD scheme 1 (Πvq1, ρini-aq)
Initial state:
A mixed state ρini-aqA′EB′
— This is the same as in the actual scheme.
Protocol Πvq1:
1. Sample measurement: Same as step 1 of
Πaq.
2. Sifted key measurement: Alice measures
HA′ to obtain sifted key a, and stores it in HA
in the Z-basis.
— We denote the result by ρsif-vq1.
3. Privacy amplification by Alice alone: Al-
ice chooses a universal2 hash function g :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m and announces the choice
publicly by writing it in HG. Then she calcu-
lates k = g(a) and stores it in HK .
— We denote the result by ρfin-vq1.
States ρsif-vq1 and ρfin-vq1, appearing in this scheme,
has the following properties:
Lemma 7.
ρsif-v1AE = ρ
sif-aq
AE , (42)
ρfin-v1KEG = ρ
fin-aq
KEG , (43)
and thus (Πvq1, ρini-aq) is indeed virtual.
Proof. In (Πvq1, ρini-aq), the initial state ρini-aqA′EB′ and Al-
ice’s operations in HAKG are identical to those in the
actual scheme (Πaq, ρini-aq). Hence at any stage of the
protocol, the reduced states for HAE or for HKEG are
also identical to those in (Πaq, ρini-aq). Thus we obtain
inequalities (42) and (43).
2. Purification of the overall state
We modify (Πvq1, ρini-aq) above further such that the
overall state before step 3, Alice’s PA, becomes pure. The
basic idea is to purify the initial state ρini-aq by introduc-
ing new ancilla spaces, and then to rewrite all measure-
ments as a unitary operation followed by a projective
measurement; for the details about these techniques, see,
e.g., section 2.2.8 of ref. [2]. More precisely, we make the
following changes to (Πvq1, ρini-aq).
1. Let Alice execute all of Bob’s operations on his be-
half, in addition to her own operations.
2. Introduce Alice’s new ancilla HA′′ , and re-
place the initial state ρini-aqA′EB′ by its purification
|Ψini〉A′EB′A′′ .
3. Introduce Alice’s new ancilla HA′′′ , and rewrite
step 1, the sample measurement, as a unitary oper-
ation U smpA′B′A′′′ followed by a measurement using a
projection P smpA′′′ . — Note that the decision of ‘con-
tinue’ or ‘abort’ is represented by projection P smpA′′′ .
4. Rewrite step 2, the sifted key measurement, as
a unitary operation U sifAA′ followed by the Z-basis
measurement in HA.
Then we obtain the following scheme. Here in order to
simplify notation, all of Alice’s ancilla spaceHA′⊗HA′′⊗
HA′′′ ⊗HB′ are denoted collectively by HA¯.
Virtual QKD scheme 2 (Πvq2, |Ψini-aq〉)
Initial state:
A pure state |Ψini-aq〉A¯E .
— This can also be written as |Ψini-aq〉A′A′′B′E
and is a purification of ρini-aqA′EB′ .
Protocol Πvq2:
1. Sample measurement: Alice applies unitary
operation U smp
A¯
and then projection P smp
A¯
.
— We denote the result by |Ψsmp-vq2〉.
2. Sifted key state preparation: Alice applies
unitary operation U sif
AA¯
.
— We denote the result by |Ψpre-vq2〉.
3. Z basis measurement: Alice measures HA
in the Z-basis to obtain sifted key a.
— We denote the result by ρsif-vq2.
4. Privacy amplification by Alice alone:
Same as step 3 of Πvq1.
— We denote the result by ρfin-vq2.
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This scheme has the following properties.
Lemma 8.
ρsif-vq2AE = ρ
sif-aq
AE , (44)
ρfin-vq2KEG = ρ
sif-aq
KEG, (45)
and therefore (Πvq2, |Ψini-aq〉) is indeed virtual. Also,
|Ψpre-vq2〉 is a semi-purification of ρsif-aqAE .
Proof. It is obvious that changes 1 through 5 above do
not affect the reduced state for HAKEG at any stage
of the protocol. Hence we have ρsif-vq2AE = ρ
sif-vq1
AE and
ρfin-vq2KEG = ρ
fin-vq1
KEG . Then by using lemma 7, we obtain in-
equalities (44) and (45). After the Z-basis measurement
(in step 3) is applied to |Ψpre-vq2〉, it becomes ρsif−vq2,
whose reduced state ρsif−vq2AE equals ρ
sif-aq
AE due to (44).
Therefore |Ψpre-vq2〉 is a semi-purification of ρsifAE (cf. def-
inition III E 2).
3. Replacing the actual PA with the virtual PA
Finally we apply the argument of section III E 2, and
replace the actual PA included in Πvq2 (i.e. steps 3 and 4
of Πvq2) by the virtual PA algorithm with twirling, Πvpt.
Virtual QKD scheme 3 (Πvq3, |Ψini-aq〉)
Initial state: A pure state |Ψini-aq〉A¯E
— This is the same as in virtual QKD scheme 2.
Protocol Πvq3:
1. Sample measurement: Alice applies unitary
operation U smp
A¯
and then projection P smp
A¯
.
2. Sifted key state preparation: Alice applies
unitary operation U sif
AA¯
.
— We denote the result by |Ψpre-vq3〉.
3. Twirling: ΠtwA|T , described in definition 3.
— We denote the result by |Ψtw-vq3〉.
4. Choice of a hash function: Alice chooses a
universal2 hash function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
and announces the choice publicly by writing
it in HG.
5. Virtual PA: Πvp,g
A|A¯T
, described in section
III B 4; that is,
(a) Phase error correction using PCg as-
sisted by ancilla measurements in
HA¯T (Πpec,gA|A¯T ).
— We denote the result by |Ψpec-vq3〉.
(b) Bit basis measurement: Measure
eigenvalues (−1)k1 , . . . , (−1)km of opera-
tors Z¯1, · · · , Z¯m in HA, and store hash
value k = (k1, . . . , km) ∈ {0, 1}m in HK .
— We denote the result by ρfin-vq3.
We note that steps 1 and 2 of Πvq3 above are identical
to those of Πvq2; we wrote them out explicitly for the
sake of completeness, since this scheme will be referred
to frequently in later subsections. This scheme has the
following properties.
Lemma 9.
ρfin-vq3KEG = ρ
fin-aq
KEG , (46)
and thus (Πvq3, |Ψini-aq〉) is virtual. Also, |Ψpre-vq3〉 is
a semi-purification, and |Ψtw-vq3〉 is a purification of
ρsif-aqAE .
Proof. Eq. (46) follows by repeating the argument of
section III E 2. Since the initial state and steps 1 and 2
are identical in the second and in the third virtual QKD
schemes, we have |Ψpre-vq2〉 = |Ψpre-vq3〉. These states
are a semi-purification of ρsif-aqAE due to lemma 8. Thus
|Ψtw-vq3〉 is a purification due to lemma 3.
D. Converting the LHL-based proofs to the
PEC-based proofs
By making use of the virtual schemes obtained above,
we next show that there are direct connections between
proofs of the LHL-based approach and of the the PEC-
based approach. First we show that the LHL-based
proofs can always be converted to those of the PEC-based
approach.
1. Brief review of the LHL-based security proof
We begin by reviewing the LHL-based security proof
of QKD briefly [11].
a. LHL-type QKD scheme As mentioned in section
IVA1, the sample measurement step of the actual pro-
tocol Πaq is designed to select out states having a cer-
tain desirable property. When one uses the LHL-based
approach for the security proof, it is customary to de-
fine the desirable property as follows, such that the LHL
(lemma 1) can readily be applied to bound d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG).
Assumption SM-LHL (Typical assumption on the
sample measurement in the LHL-based approach):
Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E) ≥ Hthmin withHthmin being a constant.
(47)
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Hence we call QKD schemes with this assumption the
LHL-type QKD schemes.
b. LHL-based security proof of the LHL-type schemes
For these schemes, the LHL-based proof usually proceeds
as follows.
(i) The situation of step 3 in (Πvq1, ρini-aq) is equiva-
lent to that of the actual PA, defined in section II.
Thus one can bound d1(ρ
fin-vq1
KEG ) by using the LHL
(lemma 1) as
d1(ρ
fin-vq1
KEG ) ≤ 2ε′′′ + 2
1
2
[m−Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-vq1
AE |E)]. (48)
(ii) From the virtuality of scheme (Πvq1, ρini-aq), i.e.,
from lemma 7, we have
d1(ρ
fin-vq1
KEG ) = d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG), (49)
Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-vq1
AE |E) = Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E). (50)
Thus inequality (48) can be rewritten as
d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG) ≤ 2ε′′′ + 2
1
2
[m−Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E)] (51)
(iii) Combining inequalities (41), (47) and (51), we ob-
tain
D1(ρ
fin-aq
KK′EG)
≤ 2−l+1 + 2ε′′′ + 2 12 [m−Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E)]
≤ 2−l+1 + 2ε′′′ + 2 12 [m−Hthmin], (52)
which completes the security proof.
2. Conversion to the PEC-based security proofs
Next we show that this type of security proofs can
always be converted to those of the PEC-based approach.
That is, for an arbitrary scheme of the LHL-type, with
assumption SM-LHL, one can always construct a proof
that relies solely on the properties of the PEC, and not
on the LHL.
a. PEC-based proof of the LHL-type schemes The
proof proceeds by similar steps as in section IVD1, only
the argument leading to the bound on d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG) is quite
different. Namely, (a) We use the third virtual scheme
(Πvq3, ρini-vq3), not the first, and reduce the security
proof to bounding d1(ρ
fin-vq3
KEG ). (b) In order to bound this
quantity, we make use of corollary 2, not of the LHL. The
actual proof proceeds as follows.
(i) The situation in steps 4 and 5 of (Πvq3, ρini-vq3)
is identical to that of the virtual PA scheme
(Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉) of section III B 4, with the input be-
ing |Ψini-ap〉 = |Ψtw-vq3〉, a purification of ρsif-aqAE (see
lemma 9). Hence we can apply corollary 2 and ob-
tain
d1(ρ
fin-vq3
KEG ) ≤ 2ε′′′ + 2
1
2
[m−Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E)+3]. (53)
(ii) From the virtuality of scheme (Πvq3, ρini-vq3), i.e.,
from lemma 9, we have
d1(ρ
fin-vq3
KEG ) = d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG), (54)
and thus inequality (53) can be rewritten as
d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG) ≤ 2ε′′′ + 2
1
2
[m−Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E)+3] (55)
(iii) Combining inequalities (41), (47) and (55), we ob-
tain
D1(ρ
fin-aq
KK′EG)
≤ 2−l+1 + 2ε′′′ + 2 12 [m−Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E)+3]
≤ 2−l+1 + 2ε′′′ + 2 12 [m−Hthmin+3]. (56)
which completes the security proof.
We again stress that the essential part of this proof, in-
equality (53), is obtained solely from the properties of
the PEC algorithm Πpec, embedded in the virtual scheme
(Πvq3, ρini-vq3). In this sense, we say that this is a proof
by the PEC-based approach. In section IVE1, we also
give a direct comparison between this and the conven-
tional forms of the PEC-based proofs.
Inequality (56) is slightly weaker than the counterpart
(52) obtained in the LHL-approach by a constant fac-
tor of 3/2 appearing in an exponent of the r.h.s. (cf.
corollary 2 for the case of PA). We regard this factor as
inessential because it can easily be compensated for in
practice, e.g., by setting length m of final key k to be 3
bits shorter.
E. Converting the PEC-based proofs to the
LHL-based proof
Next we present the conversion of the reverse direction.
That is, we show that any security proofs of the PEC-
based approach can be converted to those of the LHL-
based approach.
1. Brief review of the PEC-based security proof
We again begin by reviewing the existing method (see,
e.g., [8–10, 20]).
a. PEC-type QKD schemes Again, as in the case of
the LHL-approach, the sample measurement step of the
actual protocol Πaq is supposed to select out states hav-
ing a certain desirable property. However, when using
the PEC-based approach [8–10, 20], it is customary to de-
fine the desirable property with respect to the pure state
|Ψpre-vq3〉 appearing in the third virtual scheme. Note
that this is in strong contrast to the case of the LHL-
based approach, where the property was defined with re-
spect to ρsif in the actual scheme. In addition, it is also
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customary to define the desirable property of |Ψpre-vq3〉
in terms of its phase probability distribution pX , defined
below.
Definition 5. The distribution of phase degrees of free-
dom Xpre-vq3 of |Ψpre-vq3〉 is defined by
Pr(Xpre-vq3 = x) := 〈x˜|A ρpre-vq3A |x˜〉A , (57)
where ρpre-vq3A is the reduced state for HA corresponding
to |Ψpre-vq3〉.
In this setting, one assumes that the randomness of
Xpre-vq3 is sufficiently small, such that the PEC Πpec
inside the virtual protocol Πvq3 almost always succeeds.
Assumption SM-PEC (Typical assumptions on
the sample measurement in the PEC-based ap-
proach):
The randomness of Xpre-vq3 is sufficiently small;
e.g.,
• Example 1: The error probability
Pr(Xpre-vq3 6= 0) is bounded from above.
• Example 2: The Shannon entropy H(Xpre-vq3)
is bounded from above.
We will call QKD schemes with these types of assump-
tions the PEC-type QKD schemes.
b. PEC-based proof of the PEC-type schemes The
basic idea is the same as in the proof of the LHL-type
schemes given in section IVD2. The only difference is
that, in order to bound the failure probability P phA of the
PEC, we may use any types of a coding theorems of the
PEC, besides theorem 1. The actual proof proceeds as
follows.
(i) By using a certain coding theorem for the PEC
(e.g., theorem 1, but not necessarily restricted to
it), one bounds the average failure probability of
the PEC Πpec,g, embedded inside the third virtual
scheme (Πvq3, ρini-vq3) as
P phA (ρ
pec-vq3) ≤ P th, (58)
where function P ph(· · · ) is defined in (22), and P th
is a constant determined by assumption SM-PEC.
Then by substituting (58) in inequality (25), one
obtains the bound
d1(ρ
fin-vq3
KEG ) ≤ 2
√
2
√
P th. (59)
(ii) From the virtuality of the third virtual scheme
(lemma 9), we have d1(ρ
fin-vq3
KEG ) = d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG). Thus
inequality (59) can be rewritten as
d1(ρ
fin-aq
KEG) ≤ 2
√
2
√
P th. (60)
(iii) Combining inequalities (41) and (60), we obtain
D1(ρ
fin-aq
KK′EG) ≤ 2−l+1 + 2
√
2
√
P th, (61)
which completes the security proof.
Note that the PEC-based proof for the LHL-type
schemes, given in section IVD2, was indeed a special case
of this argument: There, the randomness of Xpre-vq3 was
measured using the minimum entropy Hε
′′′
min(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E),
and theorem 1 was used as an example of inequality (58).
2. Special case using Re´nyi entropy of degree one half
The description of the PEC-type schemes above be-
comes drastically simple by using the following quantity
as the measure of the randomness of Xpre-vq3:
Definition 6. The Re´nyi entropy of degree 1/2 of a prob-
ability distribution Pr(X = x) is defined by
H1/2(X) = 2 log
(∑
x
Pr(X = x)1/2
)2
. (62)
More precisely, suppose one uses the particular form
of assumption SM-PEC, which takes the from
Assumption SM-PEC-Re´nyi (An example of as-
sumption SM-PEC using the Re´nyi entropy):
H1/2(X
pre-vq3) ≤ Hth1/2 withHth1/2 being a constant.
(63)
Then this condition becomes reduced to a special case
of assumption SM-LHL, with Hthmin = n−Hth1/2 and ε′′′ =
0.
Lemma 10. Assumption SM-PEC-Re´nyi implies
Hmin(ρ
sif-aq
AE |E) ≥ n−Hth1/2. (64)
The proof is a direct consequence of the duality relation
between the minimum and the maximum entropies [18];
see appendix E.
Thus the situation is now reduced to that of the LHL-
type schemes of section IVD, and the security can be
proved by the LHL-based approach and also by the PEC-
based approach. The proof of the PEC-based approach
can be given by repeating the discussion of section IVD 2
or IVE1, and the result is the security bound
D1(ρ
fin-aq
KK′EG) ≤ 2−l+1 + 2
1
2
[m−n+Hth1/2+3]. (65)
If one wishes to convert this proof to the LHL-based
proof, one can use the discussion of section IVD1 and
obtain
D1(ρ
fin-aq
KK′EG) ≤ 2−l+1 + 2
1
2
[m−n+Hth1/2]. (66)
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V. CONCLUSION
We have shown the equivalence between the two ma-
jor approaches to the security proof of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD), which had generally been regarded as
independent of each other; namely, the phase error cor-
rection (PEC)-based approach and the leftover hashing
lemma (LHL)-based approach. These are also referred
to as the Shor-Preskill-Mayers approach and as Renner’s
approach.
In order to show the equivalence, we gave an explicit
procedure for converting security proofs by one approach
to those of another approach. The conversions are made
step by step in a constructive manner so that the re-
lation between the two approaches is kept transparent.
The security bounds obtained are the same regardless of
the approach, except for the presence of an inessential
constant factor.
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Appendix A: Notation
Random variables are written in capital letters. Mod-
ulo 2 is always assumed in arithmetic of binary strings;
e.g., the inner product of binary strings x = (x1, · · · , xd),
z = (z1, · · · , zd) ∈ {0, 1}d is denoted x · z =
∑d
i=1 xizi
mod 2. We use the usual representation of the Pauli ma-
trices, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
. In a d-qubit space,
Z,X of the i-th qubit are often denoted Zi, Xi. A tensor
product of Zi is often abbreviated as Z
z =
⊗d
i−1 Z
zi
i =
Zz1⊗· · ·⊗Zzd ; Xx is also defined similarly. Eigenvectors
of Z operators are denoted |z〉 for z ∈ {0, 1}d, satisfying
Zz
′ |z〉 = (−1)z′·z |z〉. Eigenvectors of X operators are
chosen to be their Fourier (or Hadamard) transforms
|x˜〉 = 2−s/2
∑
z
(−1)x·z |z〉 (A1)
for x ∈ {0, 1}d; note that these vectors satisfy Xx′ |x˜〉 =
(−1)x′·x |x˜〉. We often call |z〉 the bit basis, and |x˜〉 the
phase basis.
Completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) maps
are denoted by Π; e.g., ΠvpA|G|A′ for the virtual PA algo-
rithm defined in section III B 4. Subscripts of Π indicate
systems on which it operate. When we wish to indicate
clearly that different systems have a different role (such
as the input and the output registers, and ancillas), we
insert symbol ‘|’ between them.
We denote by operator ΠZ-mea an operation of eras-
ing non-diagonal elements in the Z basis, ΠZ-meaD (ρD) =
∑
z∈{0,1}d |z〉 〈z|D ρD |z〉 〈z|D, and call it the measure-
ment in the Z-basis, with a slight abuse of terminol-
ogy. Similarly, we also define the X-basis measurement
by ΠX-meaD (ρD) =
∑
x∈{0,1}d |x˜〉 〈x˜|D ρD |x˜〉 〈x˜|D. When-
ever we discuss phase error correction, we choose |0˜〉 to
be the correct phase, and consider all other phases as er-
rors; hence the phase error rate of a state ρD is given by
P phD (ρD) := 1− Tr
{
|0˜〉 〈0˜|D ρD
}
.
In a composite space of two d-qubit spaces HA ⊗HB,
we define a CNOT operation NA|B by
NA|B =
∑
z
|z〉 〈z|A ⊗XzB =
∑
x
ZxA ⊗ |x˜〉 〈x˜|B .(A2)
A state ρ is normalized if Trρ = 1, and sub-normalized
if Trρ ≤ 1. A state ρAB in HA ⊗ HB is a classical-
quantum (cq) state, if its HA part is diagonalized with a
basis { |vi〉 }: ρAB =
∑
i |vi〉 〈vi|A ⊗ ρiB.
The trace norm of a matrix M is defined by ‖M‖1 :=
Tr {|M |} = Tr
{√
M †M
}
.
For sub-normalized states ρ, τ , the generalized quan-
tum fidelity F and the purified distance P are defined to
be
F (ρ, τ) :=
∥∥√ρ√τ∥∥
1
+
√
(1 − Trρ)(1 − Trτ)
= Tr
{√√
ρτ
√
ρ
}
+
√
(1− Trρ)(1− Trτ), (A3)
P (ρ, τ) :=
√
1− F (ρ, τ)2 (A4)
(see, e.g., [18]). F equals the usual fidelity, as defined in
[2], when at least one of states ρ, τ is normalized. P is an
upper bound on the trace distance: ‖ρ− τ‖1 ≤ P (ρ, τ).
Sub-normalized states ρ, τ are called ε-close, and denoted
ρ ≈ε τ , when P (ρ, τ) ≤ ε.
Appendix B: Proof of theorem 1
First note that the both sides of inequality (26)
scale linearly with respect to the norm of input state,
Tr(ρini-ap) = Tr(ρpec-vp,g). Hence it suffices to prove this
theorem for the normalized case, i.e. for Tr(ρini-ap) = 1.
For this particular case, we divide theorem 1 into two
lemmas as follows.
Lemma 11. Consider the setting of virtual PA scheme
(Πvp, |Ψini-ap〉), and suppose that ρini-ap is normalized.
Then by an appropriate choice of the ancilla measure-
mentMg,s, the failure probability P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) of phase
error correction Πpec,g can be bounded from above as
P phA (ρ
pec-vp,g) ≤ 1− F
(
ρidealKE , ρ
fin-vp,g
KE
)2
, (B1)
where ρidealKE is defined in (6).
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Lemma 12. Under the setting of lemma 11, by averaging
the right hand side of Inequality (B1) with respect to a
universal2 hash function G, we obtain∑
g
Pr(G = g)
(
1− F
(
ρidealKE , ρ
fin-vp,g
KE
)2)
≤ 2m−Hmin(ρini-apAE |E). (B2)
Below we give the proofs of these lemmas.
1. Proof of lemma 11
In this proof, we abbreviate ρini-ap, |Ψini-ap〉 and
ρpec-vp,g, as ρini, |Ψini〉 and ρpec,g, respectively.
a. Reduction to a special case
First we show that it suffices to prove this lemma only
for the special case where g is chosen such that hash value
k equals the most significant m bits of sifted key a, and
the syndrome measurement are phase value of the least
significant n−m qubits.
Proposition 1. There exists a unitary transform V in
an n-qubit space that transforms the logical Z operators
Z¯i = Z
gi and the syndrome measurement operators X¯i =
Xhi to the normal Pauli matrices acting on the ith qubit:
V Z¯iV
† = Zi, (B3)
V X¯iV
† = Xi. (B4)
Proof. Recall that {g1, · · · , gm} and {h1, · · · , hn−m},
given in section III B 3, are orthogonal to each other, and
choose vectors gm+1, . . . , gn satisfying gi+m · hj = δij
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n − m. Consider a permutation over n-
bit strings defined by a linear transform a′ = av with
v := (gT1 , . . . , g
T
n ), and let V be the corresponding uni-
tary transform in the n-qubit space
V |a〉 = |av〉 . (B5)
Then relations (B3), (B4) follow from a straightforward
calculation.
We transform our virtual PA by applying this V to HA
in a straightforward manner: We transform the initial
state as
∣∣Ψini′〉 = VA ∣∣Ψini〉, which is also a purification
of a cq state with respect to the bit basis. We also replace
all the operators OiAB ∈
{
(X¯i)A, E
g,s,e
B , (Zi)A, (Z¯i)A
}
used for measurement or operation in Πvp,g with O′iAB =
VAO
i
ABV
†
A, and call it the transformed virtual PA al-
gorithm Πvp′,g. We also define the transformed phase
error correction Πpec′,g similarly. We denote the out-
puts of Πvp′,g, Πpec′,g by ρfin-vp′,g = Πvp′,g(|Ψini′〉 〈Ψini′|),
ρpec′,g = Πpec′,g(|Ψ′〉 〈Ψ′|) respectively.
Then it can easily be shown that the statement of
lemma 11 is invariant under VA:
Proposition 2. Quantities on each side of (B1) are in-
variant under VA; that is, P
ph
A (ρ
pec′,g) = P phA (ρ
pec,g)
and 1− F
(
ρideal′KE , ρ
fin-vp′,g
KE
)2
= 1− F
(
ρidealKE , ρ
fin-vp,g
KE
)2
.
Proof. 1 − F
(
ρidealKE , ρ
fin-vp,g
KE
)2
is invariant because
ρfin-vp,gKE is invariant; note here that operation inHK is not
changed by the transformation above. The invariance of
P phA (ρ
pec,g) follows by recalling the definition of the fail-
ure probability (22) and by noting ρpec′,gKE = VAρ
pec,g
KE V
†
A
and VA |0˜〉A = |0˜〉A.
Thus it suffices to prove lemma 11 for the trans-
formed case of Πvp′,g and
∣∣Ψini′〉, and from now on we
restrict ourselves to this case. Note that in this case,
measurements in HA are greatly simplified due to (B3),
(B4). Syndrome measurements of step 1(a) are phase
basis measurement using the normal Pauli operators Xi
of qubits i = m + 1, . . . , n, and hash value measure-
ments of step 2 are bit basis measurements using Zi of
qubits i = 1, . . . ,m. Thus it is convenient to rewrite
bit string a ∈ {0, 1}n as a concatenation a = aK‖aS of
aK ∈ {0, 1}m and aS ∈ {0, 1}n−m, and according to that,
divide HA as HA = HK ⊗HS , with
|a〉A = |aK‖aS〉A = |aK〉K ⊗ |aS〉S . (B6)
Then hash value equals aK , and the syndrome measure-
ment becomes the X-basis measurement in HS .
b. Fixing purification |Ψini〉
Next we write down purification |Ψini〉 of ρAE explic-
itly. The form of |Ψini〉AEB is ambiguous up to unitary
transforms in HB , but this ambiguity is canceled out
when defining ancilla measurementMg,sB , included in the
phase error correction Πpec,g. Hence we loose no gener-
ality by choosing an arbitrary |Ψini〉. Here for the ease of
notation, we divide HA′ into HA′ = HA1 ⊗HA2 , and let
|Ψini〉AEA′ =
∑
a
|a〉A ⊗ |ψa〉EA1 ⊗ |a〉A2
=
∑
aK ,aS
|aK〉K ⊗ |aS〉S ⊗ |ψaK‖aS 〉EA1
⊗ |aK〉K′ ⊗ |aS〉S′ , (B7)
where |ψa〉EA1 are arbitrarily chosen purifications of
Eve’s state ρini,aE included in the initial state (1), i.e.,
TrA1 |ψa〉〈ψa| = ρaE , and HA1 is an ancilla space intro-
duced for this purpose. System HA2 is a replica of the
n-qubit system HA, which we introduce in order to make
ρAE = TrA′(|Ψini〉 〈Ψini|) a cq state. In the second line
of (B7), we divided HA2 further into HA2 = HK′ ⊗HS′ ,
in the same way as in (B6), as
|a〉A2 = |aK‖aS〉A2 = |aK〉K′ ⊗ |aS〉S′ . (B8)
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We note that, in summary, HA and HA′ are divided as
HA = HK ⊗HS , (B9)
HA′ = HA1 ⊗HA2 = HA1 ⊗HK′ ⊗HS′ . (B10)
For later convenience, we also define a purification of
the ideal state ρidealAE to be
|Ψideal〉AEA′ := 2−n/2
∑
a
|a〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉EA1 ⊗ |a〉A2
= 2−n/2
∑
aK ,aS
|aK〉K ⊗ |aS〉S ⊗ |ϕ〉EA1
⊗ |aK〉K′ ⊗ |aS〉S′ , (B11)
where |ϕ〉EA1 is a purification of ρE defined in (7). Thus
it satisfies TrA1 |ϕ〉 〈ϕ| = ρE = TrA
(
ρiniAE
)
.
c. Unitary operation for phase error correction
By applying CNOT gate ΠcnotS′|S , defined in (A2), to
these states, we obtain
ΠcnotS′|S
∣∣Ψini〉
AEA′
(B12)
=
∑
aK ,aS
|aK〉K ⊗ |0〉S ⊗ |ψaK‖aS 〉EA1 ⊗ |aK〉K′ ⊗ |aS〉S′ ,
ΠcnotS′|S
∣∣Ψideal〉
AEA′
(B13)
= 2−m/2
∑
aK
|aK〉K ⊗ |0〉S ⊗ |ϕ〉EA1 ⊗ |aK〉K′ ⊗ |0˜〉S′ ,
which are purifications of |0〉 〈0|S⊗ρfin-vp,gKE and |0〉 〈0|S⊗
ρidealKE respectively. Hence due to Uhlmann’s theorem, we
can define a unitary operation TA′ satisfying
〈Ψideal|ΠcnotS′|STA′ΠcnotS′|S
∣∣Ψini〉
= F
(
|0〉 〈0|S ⊗ ρidealKE , |0〉 〈0|S ⊗ ρfin-vp,gKE
)
= F (ρidealKE , ρ
fin-vp,g
KE ) (B14)
(see, e.g., exercise 2.81 and theorem 9.4 of ref. [2]). We
also note that
|Φ〉 := ΠcnotA|A2
∣∣Ψideal〉
AEA′
= |0˜〉A ⊗ |ϕ〉EA1 ⊗ |0〉A2
(B15)
is a pure state with zero phase error. Thus if we define a
unitary operation WAA′ for phase error correction
WAA′ := Π
cnot
A|A2
ΠcnotS′|STA′Π
cnot
S′|S , (B16)
its failure probability can be bounded from above as
P phA
(
W |Ψini〉 〈Ψini|W †)
= 1− Tr
{(
|0˜〉 〈0˜|A ⊗ IEA′
)
W |Ψini〉 〈Ψini|W †
}
≤ 1− Tr {(|Φ〉 〈Φ|)W |Ψini〉 〈Ψini|W †}
= 1−
∣∣∣〈Ψideal∣∣ΠcnotS′|STA′ΠcnotS′|S |Ψini〉∣∣∣2
= 1− F (ρidealKE , ρfin-vp,gKE )2. (B17)
d. Actual phase error correction
It remains to show that there exists a phase error cor-
rection algorithm of the form of Πpec,g (specified inside
Πvp of section III B 4) that achieves the same failure prob-
ability as unitary phase error correction WAA′ .
To this end, we define an operator set w to be
w := {W s,eAA′ | s ∈ {0, 1}n−m, e ∈ {0, 1}n }, (B18)
where
W s,eAA′ :=
(∣∣∣s˜+ eS〉〈s˜+ eS∣∣∣
S
⊗ |e˜〉 〈e˜|A2
)
WAA′ , (B19)
and eS denotes the least significant n−m bits of e, as in
eq. (B6); e = eK‖eS. It is easy to see that w is indeed
a quantum operation satisfying
∑
s,eW
s,e†
AA′W
s,e
AA′ = IAA′ .
Further, by using eqs. (B16) and (A2), and relations
ZeA = Z
eK
K ⊗ZeSS and ZeSS |e˜S + s〉S = |s˜〉S , we can rewrite
W s,eAA′ as
W s,eAA′ = Z
e
A |s˜〉 〈s˜|S ⊗ Es,eA′ , (B20)
Es,eA′ = |e˜〉 〈e˜|A2 ZsS′TA′ZsS′ , (B21)
where Es,eA′ satisfy∑
e
Es,e†A′ E
s,e
A′ = IA′ . (B22)
Thus the quantum operation w = {W s,eAA′ | s, e } is indeed
of the form of Πpec,g.
This operation attains the same failure probability as
unitary phase error correction W , since
P phA
(∑
s,e
W s,eAA′
∣∣Ψini〉 〈Ψini∣∣W s,e†AA′
)
= 1−
∑
s,e
Tr
{
|0˜〉 〈0˜|A
(
W s,eAA′
∣∣Ψini〉 〈Ψini∣∣W s,e†AA′)}
= 1−
∑
s,e
Tr
{
|0˜〉 〈0˜|A
(
W s+eS ,eAA′
∣∣Ψini〉 〈Ψini∣∣W s+eS ,e†AA′ )}
= 1−
∑
s,e
Tr
{((
|s˜〉 〈s˜|S |0˜〉 〈0˜|A |s˜〉 〈s˜|S
)
⊗ |e˜〉 〈e˜|A2
)
×
(
WAB
∣∣Ψini〉 〈Ψini∣∣W †AB)}
= 1− Tr
{
|0˜〉 〈0˜|A
(
WAA′
∣∣Ψini〉 〈Ψini∣∣W †AA′)}
= P phA
(
WAA′
∣∣Ψini〉 〈Ψini∣∣W †AA′) , (B23)
where we used
(|e˜〉 〈e˜|A2)2 = |e˜〉 〈e˜|A2 , ∑e |e˜〉 〈e˜|A2 =
IA2 . This completes the proof of lemma 11.
2. Proof of lemma 12
In this proof, we abbreviate ρini-ap and
ρfin-vp,g(=ρfin-ap,g), as ρini and ρfin,g, respectively.
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According to ref. [24], there are quantities
H˜↓1/2(K|E)ρ = 2 log2 F (IK ⊗ ρE , ρKE), (B24)
H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ = − log2Tr
{(
ρKE
(
IK ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2}
,
(B25)
which are defined for an arbitrary state ρKE . These
quantities satisfy H˜↓1/2(K|E)ρ ≥ H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ, and so the
quantity appearing on the right hand side of eq. (B1)
can be bounded as
1− 2−mF (IK ⊗ ρ, ρKE)2 = 1− 2−m+H˜
↓
1/2
(K|E)ρ
≤ 1− 2−m+H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ ≤ 2m−H˜↓2 (K|E)ρ − 1
= 2mTr
{(
ρKE
(
IK ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2}
− 1. (B26)
On the second line of (B26), we used the fact that 1 −
1/x ≤ x− 1 for x > 0.
Then by letting ρKE = ρ
fin,g
KE in this inequality and
by averaging it with respect to the random choice of
universal2 hash function g, we obtain∑
g
Pr(G = g)
(
1− 2−mF (IK ⊗ ρE , ρfin,gKE )2
)
≤
∑
g
Pr(G = g) 2mTr
{(
ρfin,gKE
(
IK ⊗ ρ−1/2E
))2}
− 1
= −1 +
∑
g
∑
k
2m Pr(G = g)
×Tr

∑
a,a′
∈g−1(k)
(ρ
−1/4
E ρ
ini,a
E ρ
−1/4
E )(ρ
−1/4
E ρ
ini,a′
E ρ
−1/4
E )

= −1 +
∑
g
Pr(G = g)2m
∑
a,a′
1[g(a) = g(a′)]
×Tr
{(
ρ
−1/4
E ρ
ini,a
E ρ
−1/4
E
)(
ρ
−1/4
E ρ
ini,a′
E ρ
−1/4
E
)}
≤ −1 + 2m
∑
a,a′
(
1[a = a′] + 2−m
)
×Tr
{(
ρ
−1/4
E ρ
ini,a
E ρ
−1/4
E
)(
ρ
−1/4
E ρ
ini,a′
E ρ
−1/4
E
)}
= 2m−H˜
↓
2 (A|E)ρini . (B27)
Here, function 1[· · · ] takes value one if the condition in-
side brackets holds, and zero otherwise. Due to eq. (7),
the reduced states for system HE corresponding to ρfin,g
and to ρini are the same, and we denoted it here as ρE .
The second inequality of (B27) holds because the quan-
tity Tr {· · · } is non-negative, and g is a universal2 hash
function, satisfying inequality (13). It should be noted
that, in fact, the second and further lines of inequality
(B27) are essentially a special case of lemma 5.4.3, ref.
[11], with σE = ρE .
Next by setting α =∞ in eq. (48), corollary 4, ref. [24]
(also see the paragraph of eq. (52) of the same paper),
we obtain
Hmin(ρ
ini
AE |E) = H˜↑∞(A|E)ρini ≤ H˜↓2 (A|E)ρini . (B28)
Finally by combining inequalities (B27) and (B28), we
obtain (B2).
Appendix C: Proof of Inequality (23)
Again by using the same argument as in appendix
B1 a, we may assume that system HA is divided as
HA = HK ⊗HS , as in (B6). In this case, the step 2.(b)
of the virtual PA scheme is the usual Z-basis measure-
ment in HK . In addition, it is straightforward to see that
phase error probability in HK is bounded by that in HA,
P phK (ρ
pec-vp,g) ≤ P phA (ρpec-vp,g) . (C1)
Thus it suffices to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Let HK be a system of m-qubits, and HE
be a system of an arbitrary dimension. Then for an ar-
bitrary state ρKE in HKE, we have
d1
(
ΠZ-meaK (ρKE)
) ≤ 2√2√P phK (ρKE), (C2)
where ΠZ-meaK is the Z-basis measurement in HK ;
ΠZ-meaK (ρKE) =
∑
z |z〉 〈z|K ρKE |z〉 〈z|K (cf. appendix
A).
Proof. Choose an arbitrary purification |Ψ′〉KEB of ρKE ,
with HB being an ancilla space. Also define another m-
qubit ancilla spaceHC , and let |0˜〉C be one of theX-basis
states there. Then
|Ψ〉KEBC = |Ψ′〉KEB ⊗ |0˜〉C (C3)
is also a purification of ρKE . This state can be expanded
with respect to the Z-basis of HK as
|Ψ〉KEBC =
∑
k
|k〉K ⊗ |ψk〉EB ⊗ |0˜〉C . (C4)
With this setting, it is straightforward to verify that
|ψk〉EB and ΠZ-meaK (ρKE) are related as
ΠZ-meaK (ρKE) =
∑
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ ρkE , (C5)
ρkE = TrB(|ψk〉 〈ψk|EB). (C6)
The ideal state corresponding to ΠZ-meaK (ρKE) takes
the form(
ΠZ-meaK (ρKE)
)ideal
= 2−mIK ⊗
∑
k
ρkE , (C7)
and we can choose a semi-purification of(
ΠZ-meaK (ρKE)
)ideal
to be
|Ψideal〉KEBC := |0˜〉K ⊗
∑
k
|ψk〉EB ⊗ |k〉C ; (C8)
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this is equivalent to saying that |Ψideal〉 satisfies the fol-
lowing relation
(ΠZ-meaK (ρKE))
ideal = ΠZ-meaK
(
TrBC |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal|
)
.
(C9)
Thus
d1(Π
Z-mea
K (ρKE))
=
∥∥ΠZ-meaK (ρKE)− (ΠZ-meaK (ρKE))ideal∥∥1
=
∥∥∥ΠZ-meaK (TrBC |Ψ〉 〈Ψ|)
−ΠZ-meaK
(
TrBC |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal|
)∥∥∥
1
≤ ∥∥|Ψ〉 〈Ψ| − |Ψideal〉 〈Ψideal|∥∥
1
≤ 2
√
1− |〈Ψ|Ψideal〉|2
= 2
√
(1− |〈Ψ|Ψideal〉|) (1 + |〈Ψ|Ψideal〉|)
≤ 2
√
2
√
1− |〈Ψ|Ψideal〉|. (C10)
On the fourth line we used the monotonicity of trace
distance with respect to CPTP maps, ΠZ-meaK and TrBC .
The fourth line follows by definitions of the trace distance
and of the fidelity; see, e.g., section 9.2.3, ref. [2]. The
sixth line follows from
∣∣〈Ψ|Ψideal〉∣∣ ≤ 1.
Next note that |Ψ〉 and |Ψideal〉 can be rewritten as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
x
|x˜〉K ⊗ |ψ˜x〉EB ⊗ |0˜〉C , (C11)
|Ψideal〉 =
∑
x
|0˜〉K ⊗ |ψ˜x〉EB ⊗ |x˜〉C , (C12)
|ψ˜x〉EB := 2−m/2
∑
k
(−1)x·k|ψk〉EB, (C13)
and thus P phK (ρKE) takes the form
P phK (ρKE) = 1− 〈ψ˜0|ψ˜0〉EB = 1−
∣∣〈Ψ|Ψideal〉∣∣ . (C14)
By combining (C10) and (C14), we obtain (C2).
Appendix D: Proof of lemma 5
In this proof, we often abbreviate ρfin-aqKK′EG as ρ
fin
KK′EG.
By using the triangle inequality of the trace distance,
D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG) can be bounded as
D1(ρ
fin
KK′EG)
=
∥∥ρfinKK′EG − ρidealKK′E∥∥1 (D1)
≤
∥∥ρfinKK′EG − ρintKK′EG∥∥1 + ∥∥ρintKK′EG − ρidealKK′EG∥∥1 .
where ρintKK′EG is defined as
ρintKK′EG :=
∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ |k〉 〈k|K′ ⊗
(∑
k′
ρfin,k,k
′
EG
)
,
(D2)
ρk,k
′
EG =
∑
g
Pr(G = g)ρfin,g,k,k
′
E ⊗ |g〉 〈g|G (D3)
with ρfin,g,k,k
′
E being ρ
fin-aq,g,k,k′
E defined in (33). Super-
script ‘int’ of ρint means that it is an ‘intermediate’ state
between ρfinKK′EG and ρ
ideal
KK′EG.
The two terms on the right hand side of (D1) can each
be bounded as∥∥ρfinKK′EG − ρintKK′EG∥∥1
=
∥∥∥∥∑
k,k′
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ |k′〉 〈k′|K′
⊗
(
ρfin,k,k
′
EG − δk,k′
(∑
k′
ρfin,k,k
′
EG
))∥∥∥∥
=
∑
k 6=k′
∥∥∥ρfin,k,k′EG ∥∥∥+∑
k
∥∥∥∥∥ρfin,k,kEG −∑
k′
ρfin,k,k
′
EG
∥∥∥∥∥
=
∑
k 6=k′
∥∥∥ρfin,k,k′EG ∥∥∥+∑
k
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
k′( 6=k)
ρfin,k,k
′
E
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 2
∑
k 6=k′
∥∥∥ρfin,k,k′EG ∥∥∥ = 2 ∑
k 6=k′
Tr
(
ρfin,k,k
′
EG
)
= 2Pr(K 6= K ′ ∧ ρfinKK′), (D4)
and∥∥ρintKK′EG − ρidealKK′EG∥∥1
=
∥∥∥∥∥∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗ |k〉 〈k|K′ ⊗
(∑
k′
ρfin,k,k
′
EG − 2−mρfinEG
)∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥∑
k
|k〉 〈k|K ⊗
(∑
k′
ρfin,k,k
′
EG − 2−mρfinEG
)∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥TrK′(ρfinKK′EG)− 2−mIK ⊗ ρfinEG∥∥1
= d1(ρ
fin
KEG). (D5)
Combining Inequalities (D1), (D4), and (D5), we obtain
inequality (39).
Appendix E: Proof of lemma 10
Let ρpre-vq3,Z-mea
AA¯E
be the result of applying the Z-basis
measurement in system HA on |Ψpre-vq3〉AA¯E ,
ρpre-vq3,Z-mea
AA¯E
= ΠZ-meaA (|Ψpre-vq3〉 〈Ψpre-vq3|AA¯E) (E1)
=
∑
z
|z〉 〈z|A
(|Ψpre-vq3〉 〈Ψpre-vq3|AA¯E) |z〉 〈z|A .
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Simlarly, let ρpre-vq3,X-mea
AA¯E
be the result of applying the
X-basis measurement in system HA on |Ψpre-vq3〉AA¯E ,
ρpre-vq3,X-mea
AA¯E
= ΠX-meaA (|Ψpre-vq3〉 〈Ψpre-vq3|AA¯E) (E2)
=
∑
x
|x˜〉 〈x˜|A
(|Ψpre-vq3〉 〈Ψpre-vq3|AA¯E) |x˜〉 〈x˜|A
Then by using the uncertainty relation between the mini-
mum and the maximum entropies (theorem 7.1, ref. [18]),
we obtain
Hmin(ρ
pre-vq3,Z-mea
AE |E) +Hmax(ρpre-vq3,X-meaAA¯ |A¯) ≥ n,
(E3)
where ρpre-vq3,Z-meaAE = TrA¯(ρ
pre-vq3,Z-mea
AA¯E
), and
ρpre-vq3,X-mea
AA¯
= TrE(ρ
pre-vq3,X-mea
AA¯E
).
Next note that |Ψpre-vq3〉AA¯E is a semi-purification of
ρsif-aqAE due to lemma 9. Then it follows that
ρpre-vq3,Z-meaAE = ρ
sif-aq
AE (E4)
and thus
Hmin(ρ
pre-vq3,Z-mea
AE |E) = Hmin(ρsif-aqAE |E) (E5)
Also by using the data processing inequality of the
maximum entropy [18], Hmax(ρ
pre-vq3,X-mea
AA¯
|A¯) can be
bounded as
Hmax(ρ
pre-vq3,X-mea
A ) ≥ Hmax(ρpre-vq3,X-meaAA¯ |A¯), (E6)
where ρpre-vq3,X-meaA = TrA¯(ρ
pre-vq3,X-mea
AA¯
). More pre-
cisely, inequality (E6) follows from Result 4, section 5.1.1,
ref. [18], which is a special case of theorem 5.7 of the same
literature, with HB′ , HC and HC′ being one-dimensional
spaces, and maps E and F being the identity, and G being
tracing out of HB.
Further, due to (57), ρpre-vq3,X-meaA takes the form
ρpre-vq3,X-meaA =
∑
x
Pr(Xpre-vq3 = x) |x˜〉 〈x˜|A . (E7)
Thus by using the results of the section 4.3.2, ref. [18],
it follows that
H1/2(X
pre-vq3) = Hmax(ρ
pre-vq3,X-mea
A ). (E8)
Finally combining (63), (E3), (E5), (E6), and (E8), we
obtain the lemma.
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